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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
in which the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a professional
counselor who had given information to married couples regarding the
use of contraceptives in violation of Connecticut law. The Court rea-
soned that a married couple's right to decide whether or not to receive
information and devices or to practice birth control is protected by an
implied constitutional right of privacy.2 2 Recognizing this right neces-
sarily implies that a state cannot be allowed to prohibit the dissemination
of information and devices which are essential to its existence.
The Dellapia court joins the growing minority of jurisdictions which
have extended Stanley beyond its facts.2- In its logical and narrowly
circumscribed extension, which provides a legitimate source for adult
material acquired for private enjoyment, however, the court recognizes
a concurrent governmental right to enforce statutory provisions that
protect a recognized public interest.
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Evidence-NARCOTICS-QANTITY REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION OF POS-
SESSION. Robbsv. Cotmnonwvealth, 211 Va. 153, 176 S.E. 2d 429 (1970).
In September 1968, the defendant was convicted by a trial court,
sitting without a jury, of possession of heroin under section 54-488 of
the Virginia Code,' a part of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. On
appeal she contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her
conviction in that it failed to establish possession of a useable quantity
of the narcotic.
22. Although the right of privacy is not explicitly enumerated, it is within the
penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484.
23. For a thorough discussion of the logic of extending Stanley beyond its facts see
Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine Is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REv. 185,
229 (1969); Laughlin, A Requiem for Requiems: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Reality, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1389 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1, 147 (1969); Note, The New Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenities, 57 CALIF. L. REv.
1257, 1278, 1279 (1969); 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 503 (1969).
24. See note 12, supra.
1. 'It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his con-
trol, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense or compound any narcotic drug, except as
authorized in this article." This section, along with the rest of the Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act, was repealed by the General Assembly in April, 1970. It was replaced by
The Drug Control Act, ch. 650, [1970] Va. Acts. The corresponding language of the
new law is found in VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.101(c) (Supp. 1970): "It is unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled drug unless such sub-
stance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a prac-
titioner ... :
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In affirming the conviction, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that a useable amount of a narcotic is not required for a conviction
of possession.2
A majority of the jurisdictions which have considered this question
have held that quantity is immaterial to a conviction for possession of
a narcotic.3 Others have limited convictions to cases involving a useable
quantity,4 while a third group have declined to rule expressly on the
issue.5
The question was first considered in 1953, when a Maryland court
held that the quantity possessed was immaterial." This rule has re-
mained unchanged in Maryland, and was reaffirmed as recently as 1970.1
Two states, Alabama and Texas, reached contra decisions on the issue
in 1956. The rule adopted in Alabama8 was identical to that of Mary-
land, but in Texas it was held that the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act did
not authorize conviction for possession of "a small piece of wet cotton
containing a trace of a narcotic such as may have been wiped from a
needle following an injection." 9 This standard was clarified the fol-
lowing year when the court held that "there must be possessed an
amount sufficient to be applied to the use commonly made thereof." 10
It was subsequently qualified, however, to the extent that the state is
not required to allege a useable amount in its indictment."
In 1961, Colorado followed Maryland and Alabama by holding that
"possession of a modicum ... brings one within the inhibitions of the
statute." 12
In 1962, however, Arizona joined Texas by ruling that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain a conviction when "the amount was incapable
of being put to any effective use." 13 Arizona subsequently departed
from the Texas interpretation by holding that when the amount was so
small that a layman could not decide on its useability, the state was
2. Robbs v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 153, 176 S.E.2d 429 (1970).
3. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits, and the courts of Alabama,
Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Utah, Wisconsin.
4. Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Texas.
5. Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, New York.
6. Peachie v. State, 203 Md. 239, 100 A.2d 1 (1953).
7. Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 260 A.2d 656 (1970).
8. Schenher v. State, 38 Ala. App. 573, 90 So. 2d 234 (1956).
9. Greer v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 377, 292 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
10. Pelham v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 226, -, 298 S.W.2d 171, 173 (1957).
11. Locke v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 361, 334 S.W.2d 292 (1960).
12. Mickens v. People, 148 Colo. 237, 241, 365 P.2d 679, 681 (1961).
13. State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, -, 374 P.2d 872, 875 (1962).
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required to offer "positive evidence that the amount in possession is a
useable amount." 14
In the same year the New York Appellate Division declined to estab-
lish an absolute requirement of a useable quantity for a conviction, but,
in reversing a conviction, the court appeared to give weight to the fact
that the quantity involved was so small that it was consumed in tests
necessary for identification. 5
The next state to consider this question was Utah, which in 1964 held
that "[t he determinative test is possession of a narcotic drug, and not
useability of a narcotic drug." 16 Wisconsin followed suit in 1965, ruling
that the "amount need not be a useable amount" 17 to sustain a convic-
tion for possession.
California, one of the four states which did not adopt the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act,' decided the issue in 1966. Reviewing previous
case law, the court held that the legislature had not intended to impose
sanctions on "useless traces or residue" :9 and that possession of such an
amount "does not constitute sufficient evidence in itself to sustain a
conviction." 20
In 1967, the District of Columbia followed the reasoning of the Texas,
Arizona, and California courts in holding that "where there is only a
trace of a substance.., and there is no additional proof of its useability
as a narcotic, there can be no conviction .... ," 21 The Court of Appeals
for the D. C. Circuit subsequently defined this rule to require evidence
that the amount "was more than a trace, and that it was capable of
quantitative analysis." 2 The court further qualified the rule in the
District by stating: "This court has never held that the Government
must prove the specific quantum of a narcotic drug possessed by the
accused as a predicate for his conviction of narcotic offenses." 2 Also
in 1967, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a con-
14. State v. Urias, 8 Ariz. App. 319, -, 446 P.2d 18, 20 (1968).
15. People v. Pipin, 16 App. Div. 2d 635, 227 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1962).
16. State v. Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, -, 396 P.2d 872, 875 (1964).
17. State v. Dodd, 28 Wis.2d 643, -, 137 N.W.2d 465, 469 (1965).
18. The California statute imposes sanctions on "every person who possesses any nar-
cotic . .. !' CAL. HEALnTI & SAv 'rY CODE § 11500 (West 1964). Thus its guidelines on
quantity required for a conviction of possession are virtually identical to those of the
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. See note 1, supra.
19. People v. Leal, 64 Cal. 2d 504, -, 413 P.2d 665, 670, 50 Cal. Rptr. 777, 782 (1966).
20. Id.
21. Edelin v. United States, 227 A.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
22. Hinton v. United States, 424 F.2d 876, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
23. Id.
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viction for possession could be sustained "as long as the evidence was
sufficient ... to sustain the jury's verdict that... [the defendant pos-
sessed] cocaine in some amount." 24
Three states were presented with this question in 1968. Illinois hedged
somewhat by holding only that where the amount is not consumed
during chemical analysis, a rebuttable presumption is raised that the
amount "was sufficient for common use." 25 The court therefore only
inferred that a conviction would not be affirmed if the amount were
insufficient for common use. Missouri20 and New Jersey 2r expressly
held that any measurable quantity was sufficient to sustain a conviction.
In 1969, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed that
of the Second: "The Federal law only requires that some measurable
amount of narcotic drug be contained in the substance which is the sub-
ject of the Indictment." 28
Three states besides Virginia considered this problem in 1970. Florida
adopted the majority rule that "the quantity possessed is immaterial." 20
In Minnesota, a conviction involving an unuseable amount was over-
turned, but the reason was that possession itself was not established
rather than any insufficiency in the quantity.30 The Idaho court found it
unnecessary to rule on the question since the evidence indicated posses-
sion of a large amount.31
By its holding in Robbs, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
adopted the majority rule that the quantity of a narcotic is immaterial
to a conviction for the offense of possession. The court reached its
decision through interpretation of a statute which was no longer in
force in Virginia. The language of the replacement legislation, how-
ever, does not indicate an intent which would produce a contrary result.8 2
Thus, in this case of first impression, the court expressly rejected any
24. United States v. Wanton, 380 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1967).
25. People v. Hartfield, 94 M1. App.2d 421, -, 237 N. E. 2d 193, 198 (1968).
26. State v. Young, 427 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. 1968).
27. State v. Humphreys, 101 N.J. Super. 539, 245 A.2d 40 (1968). On appeal the
rationale used by many courts in holding quantity immaterial was aptly summarized:
"Line-drawing among varying quantities of marijuana is unrealistic, since the small
quantity readily warrants the inference that the defendant possessed a larger usable
amount, and it is the possession of the latter amount which is the ultimate triable issue
in the case." State v. Humphreys, 54 N.J. 406, -, 255 A.2d 273, 276 (1969).
28. Jordan v. United States, 416 F.2d 338, 344 (9th Cir. 1969).
29. State v. Eckroth, 238 So. 2d 75, 77 (Fla. 1970).
30. State v. Resnick, -, Minn. -, 177 N.W.2d 418 (1970).
31. State v. Segovia, 93 Idaho 594, 468 P.2d 660 (1970).
32. See note 1, supra. See also REPOT o THE PHARmAcy AND DRUG LAws SrTUY CoAT-
MIssioN, H. Doc. No. 27 (1970) (Va.).
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requirement of a useable amount to sustain a conviction for illegal pos-
session of a narcotic, and established that the quantity was sufficient if
it were capable of chemical analysis and identification.
DOUGLAS S. WOOD
Federal Procedure-STANDING TO SUE IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION SUITS. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
The Sierra Club' sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
from the proposed development of a resort area and the construction of
a highway on federal lands under the administrative jurisdiction of the
Departments of Agriculture and Interior. The plaintiffs contended that
in granting permits for the development the Secretaries exceeded their
authority, and that the result would be "permanent destruction of nat-
ural values" and "irreparable harm to the public interest." The district
court granted a preliminary injunction3 and the defendants appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
injunction was improperly granted.4 Although determining that the de-
fendants should prevail on the merits, the court disposed of the case on
the theory that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary standing to sue.
"Simply stated but difficult to apply, standing has been called 'one
of the most amorphous concepts in the entire domain of the public
1. The Sierra Club is a non-profit California corporation organized for the purpose
of protecting the integrity of the environment and promoting conservation, and has a
history of involvement in the preservation of scenic and recreational resources. Although
the Club draws upon the entire country for its membership, the court found that there
was no allegation in the complaint that local residents of the Mineral King Valley were
members.
2. The Secretary of Agriculture, pursuant to acceptance of the lowest bid for the
project, issued a permit for development to Walt Disney Industries. The proposed plan
called for the construction of overnight accommodations, automobile parking facilities,
a cog railway, ski trails and lifts, and sewage treatment plants. The State of California,
with the permission of the Secretary of Interior, proposed to construct an access road
and power transmission lines through the Sequoia National Park and Forest to facilitate
the proposed resort.
3. Sierra Club v. Hickel, No. 51,464 (N.D. Cal., July 23, 1969). The court asserted
jurisdiction and granted relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(Supp. V, 1970), which provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." The injunction was issued under
the authority of 5 U.S.C. § 705 (Supp. V, 1970).
4. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub non. Sierra
Club v. Morton, 91 S.Ct. 870 (1971), reprinted in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL REP. 1669 (1970).
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